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Abstract 
This paper argues that the East Asian success stories do not owe their growth to 
liberalised markets and laissez faire industrial policies, but to industrial development 
strategies that share several similarities to the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) 
approach. There are, needless to say, some important fundamental differences which 
determine why Latin America and East Asia demonstrated such different outcomes, but these 
have become obvious only with hindsight. Nonetheless, the switch from ISI to the 
Washington Consensus-derived, neo-liberal ‘New Economic Model’ (NEM) has not in any 
way minimised these differences. I argue that the NEM – as currently formulated – cannot 
sustain long-term industrial development, and is likely to erode the gains made from ISI 
programmes for the sake of efficiency and export growth. The ISI-to-NEM shift has not re-
oriented Latin America towards the East Asian model but away from it. I identify five 
important problems with the ISI restructuring model which have reduced the opportunities for 
duplicating the east Asian success story, 1.The attenuation of the role of government; 2.  
unreasonable expectations from the liberalisation of FDI for industrial development; 3. the 
failure to sustain absorptive capacity; 4. The failure to sequence FDI and domestic capacity in 
tandem; and 5. The failure to recognise the inertia of transition, and coordination failures. 
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1. Introduction 
 
At the risk of oversimplification, there has been a volte face in terms of policy 
perspectives among developing countries. During much of the post WWII era, the 
development strategies in these countries revolved around the concept of catching-up through 
the fostering of domestic industrial capacity. The origins of this approach are not new:  Since 
at least the late 18th century when most western countries sought to ‘catch-up’ with Britain, 
the centrepiece of industrial development used much the same approach, with the basic 
principles laid out by Smith (1776), Hamilton (1791) and List (1844) among others. Every 
nation state considered it essential to possess national capacity in so-called ‘essential’ 
industries. Inward FDI and trade were largely controlled and limited in their scope, unless it 
met stringent conditions that promoted the self-sufficiency view by enhancing the host 
country’s domestic sector. This view considered government intervention as a necessary tool 
for promoting infant industries. Although the developing countries have used several 
variations of this approach, this paper will focus on contrasting two particular industrial 
development strategies, the first was the ‘pure’ import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) 
model favoured by Latin America, and the export-oriented (but still very much 
interventionist) model favoured by Japan, and the Asian NICs.  
Over the last 15 years or so - whether voluntarily or through World Bank-sanctioned 
structural adjustment programs -the focus of the first group has shifted away from promoting 
domestic industrial development towards policies promoting economic efficiency and the role 
of the market. Policies are oriented towards export-led growth and increased cross-border 
specialisation and competition, and most countries are now trying to promote economic 
growth through FDI and international trade – what has been referred to as the ‘New Economic 
Model’ (NEM) (Reinhardt and Peres 2000). The NEM draws some of its inspiration from the 
belief that the success of the second group – the Asian NICs – derives from just such an 
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approach2. This wave of liberalisation is part of the new, received wisdom that is focused on 
tackling the deep-rooted causes that underlie market distortions, because the new orthodoxy 
regards markets as being generally efficient. Indeed, tariff rates in Latin America have fallen 
from an average of 24.1% during 1986-90, to 11.1% during 1996-1999. The equivalent 
figures for East Asia are 20.7% and 10.4% (Hoekman 2002). Non-tariff barriers have also 
come down substantially, and are on average half those in East Asia (Hoekman 2002). 
Subsidies and state interventions have been drastically reduced, with markets and efficiency 
being paramount. Restrictions on FDI have been eased, and in many cases completely 
eliminated. Despite the application of this new orthodoxy, results from Latin America (where 
the NEM has most systematically been applied) indicate that these new policies have 
produced mixed results at best.  
It is important to emphasise two points. First that different countries applied the ISI 
framework to differing extents. There is a wide range of experiences with ISI, because the ISI 
approach requires implementation of a wide variety of policies and interventions at multiple 
levels, from establishing and enforcing industrial, technological and sectoral targeting, the 
promotion of local content, the acquisition and upgrading of technologies, the creation of 
basic and knowledge infrastructure, and infrastructure. In addition, policies and institutions on 
competition, procurement, tariffs, subsidies, regulation and the like need to be established and 
applied concurrently to achieve industrial development.  This is exceedingly complicated and 
is done within the framework of social, political and cultural institutions, which affect and 
shape the effectiveness of any strategy. Different social and political groups, furthermore, 
have vested interests and obligations which must be maintained and affect the rigour with 
which particular policies are applied in practice. Thus Latin America consists of a wide 
variety of outcomes, with countries such as Brazil and Chile having more successfully 
harnessed opportunities, relative to Argentina or Colombia. In Asia, likewise, India’s ISI 
programmes built up considerable capacity, relative to the Philippines.  
 For similar reasons, the implementation of the NEM has occurred equally unevenly. 
India and Brazil have sought a middle ground between NEM-type liberalisation and ISI, while 
Mexico has adopted the NEM, lock, stock and barrel. Thus, both ISI and NEM are stylised 
terminologies as used here, as is the concept of a single ‘Latin American experience’ or an 
‘Asian’ or ‘East Asian experience’. I realise I am in danger of over-generalising, but I believe 
important lessons can be drawn from a broad brush-stroke study such as this.  
                                                 
2 See World Bank (1994).  
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Second, Mexico’s post ISI experience cannot be viewed in the same light as that of the 
rest of Latin America. Reinhardt and Peres (2000) argue that a clear distinction can be made 
between countries north and south of Panama: Countries north of Panama have the advantage 
of geographical proximity to the US, and US policies have actively promoted trade and 
investment with these countries. This is most obvious in Mexico, which has been fully 
integrated within NAFTA. The Caribbean countries are also more closely linked to the US 
through a series of multilateral and bilateral arrangements. Proximity with, and special trading 
relationships to the US act as a unique locational advantage, which are not discussed here.   
 This paper takes as a starting point – shared by a large number of scholars3- that the 
East Asian success stories do not in fact owe their growth to liberalised markets and laissez 
faire industrial policies, but to domestic industrial development strategies that share several 
similarities to the ISI approach. There are, needless to say, some important fundamental 
differences which determine why these two groups of countries demonstrated such different 
outcomes, but these have become obvious only with hindsight. Nonetheless, the switch from 
ISI to NEM has not in any way minimised these differences, and, if anything, the hybrid ‘ISI 
restructuring model’ (which is a result of superimposing NEM policies on systems weaned on 
ISI policies) is even further away ideologically from the East Asian experience. This paper 
takes the view that the NEM – as currently formulated – cannot sustain long-term industrial 
development, and is likely to erode the gains made from ISI programmes for the sake of 
efficiency and export growth.  
 
2. Classifying development stages and policies: some taxonomies 
Comparing any two countries is a task fraught with complications. Comparing two 
regions with individual countries as diverse and heterogeneous in and amongst themselves is 
even more complex.  
***TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE*** 
It is probably most useful to distinguish between the countries in the two regions along 
two dimensions. First, as table 1 illustrates, there is considerable variation in the level of 
economic development, basic demography and income levels.  It is axiomatic that these issues 
determine the kinds of economic activity, domestic industrial structure and foreign direct 
investment associated with them, which reflects the economic structure and the nature of the 
country’s technological capabilities. We can distinguish between four stages of knowledge 
                                                 
3 See e.g., (Wade 1988, 1990), Nelson and Pack (1995), Pack (2001), Lall (1990, 1996, 2002), Amsden (1989, 
2001), Rodrik (1999)  
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accumulation: the pre-catching up stage, the catching-up stage, the pre-frontier-sharing stage, 
and the frontier-sharing stage (Criscuolo and Narula 2002). Some general characteristics of 
these stages are highlighted in table 2. Generally speaking, pre-catching-up countries are the 
least developed countries with low GDP per capita and poorly developed technological 
capabilities, and include countries such as Bolivia, Vietnam and Paraguay. These countries 
have yet to develop an “adequate” minimum level of technological capacity.  Acquiring and 
sustaining this threshold level of absorptive capacity occurs in the ‘pre-catching-up’ stage. 
Catching-up countries have achieved the necessary threshold level of technological capacity 
(as indicated by the presence of basic infrastructure, some level of knowledge infrastructure 
and a certain domestic industrial capacity), such as China, India, Malaysia, Brazil, Chile, 
Argentina. As any given country approaches the technological frontier4, the accumulation 
process proceeds at a slower pace (‘the pre-frontier-sharing’ stage). The assimilation of 
external knowledge becomes more difficult, both because of the increasing complexity and 
the quantity of knowledge, and the difficulties of acquiring this knowledge. Pre-frontier-
sharing countries are in the process of converging on the frontier, and are mainly the so-called 
Asian NICs, and include Taiwan and Korea.   
***TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE*** 
It is necessary too, to distinguish between policy orientations, with regards to 
developing and upgrading domestic competitiveness. Although there is a tendency to regard 
economies within a dichotomy of either an outward-oriented, export-oriented policy 
orientation (OL-EO), or an inward-looking, import/substituting orientation (IL-IS) (Ozawa 
1992, Narula 1996). This is naturally an oversimplification of reality, since in reality there 
tends to be a hybrid policy orientation.  For the purposes of this paper, I want to distinguish 
between the various Asian experiences from the Latin American experiences. We utilise a 
taxonomy based on Lall (2002), who distinguishes between for different approaches, which 
are not exclusive. The East Asian experience can be classified into three different types:  
East Asian model (1): Autonomous strategy. This is the model undertaken by Korea, 
and to a lesser extent, Taiwan. The primary objective was the upgrading of domestic firms, by 
selective restrictions on FDI (in the case of Taiwan), and the use of technology imports (in the 
case of Korea). In other words, foreign participation was largely limited in targeted sectors, 
with complex industrial policies that encouraged upgrading. The yard stick for industrial 
development – and indeed, the objective - was to promote competitiveness in exporting, and 
                                                 
4 We define the technological frontier as the set of all production methods that at any given time are either most 
economical or most productive in the world. 
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this determined which sectors were targeted, and the extent to which subsidies and incentives 
were provided. 
East Asian model (2): Strategic FDI dependent strategy.  This strategy is best 
exampled by Singapore, which due to the restrictions due to its limited size, could not pursue 
an efficient domestic industrial base. It sought instead to attract MNE activity, and then made 
strong efforts to upgrade the quality of FDI towards higher value-adding activities.   
East Asian model (3): Passive FDI dependent strategy  In this model, FDI was also the 
primary driver, but instead to intervening to encourage upgrading (as with strategic FDI 
dependency), it relied on market forces to encourage the upgrading process. Although policies 
to encourage the development of ‘generic’ location advantages were implemented (such as 
infrastructure development, incentives for exports, skilled cheap labour), the development of 
complementary domestic industrial capacity was not developed in tandem with FDI 
upgrading. This model has been followed by Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia.  
Latin America – like Asia and much of Africa - followed the ISI model. The ISI 
approach also had as a primary objective the upgrading of domestic firms, by selective 
restrictions on FDI and the use of technology imports, but focused on import-substitution, 
rather than promoting exports.  
Since the mid 1980s, these countries are regarded to have adopted the ‘ISI 
restructuring model’.  This is a hybrid model based on a rapid transition from ISI to NEM, 
having undertaken trade liberalisation and export incentives, often as part of a structural 
adjustment programme. Some countries have relied on MNEs to drive their growth strategy, 
while others have depended almost entirely on domestic firms, and the inflow of technology 
through arms-length arrangements such as licensing.  
 
As I have emphasised earlier, these are by no means exclusive. Several countries have used 
different models for different sectors, as well as switching between different models over 
time.  There is considerable overlap between these models.  
My interest in the current paper is to highlight the similarities and differences between 
the ISI model and the autonomous model. The next section discusses this, by taking a 
retrospective view, and then discusses the nature of the ISI-NEM hybrid (‘ISI restructuring’)  
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3. Asia and Latin America: Are their approaches to industrialisation very different? 
Comparing ISI with the autonomous strategy 
 
Latin American economies are individually very different, with different languages, 
geographies, histories and resource endowments. Nonetheless, they share a few common 
features. First, they have all pursued an import-substituting, inward looking policy orientation 
for the several decades prior to the current trend towards liberalisation, roughly until to the 
early 1990s. Indeed, the ideas and principles behind the Dependencia School are native to 
Latin America. Second – but not entirely unrelated to the first point – there has been a long 
love-hate relationship between the US and Latin America stretching back to the late 19th 
century.  The US has regarded the South American continent as its backyard, and has been the 
largest trading and investment partner for over a century now. In addition, it has intervened 
politically and militarily on numerous occasions to maintain its economic and political 
dominance of the region. Third, most countries in the Latin America have been politically 
independent for over a 100 years, insofar as they are self-governing. Fourth, they have had a 
historical dependence on natural resource and extractive industries, a trend which the import-
substitution policies implemented in the 1950s and 1960s were to have helped reduce. These 
issues have– intentionally or not – coloured the attitudes of government policies towards 
industrial development, as well as the kinds of FDI that have been received by Latin 
American countries within the current wave of economic liberalisation.  
At the risk of oversimplifying a complex set of developments5, the doctrine of import 
substitution took hold in the post World War II era, whereby leading economists of the day 
rejected the market solution as a means for the under-developed south to catch-up with the 
developed north, by moving away from exporting primary commodities and importing 
manufactures, towards developing a domestic industrial base. This, it was argued, would 
capture the rents that derived to the developed economies from value adding to the primary 
commodities imported from the south, and the resulting structural change would spur 
economic development, as well as promoting economic independence. The implementation of 
impost-substitution generally involved a high degree of central planning, combined with 
protection. Protection was undertaken through tariffs, exchange rate manipulation, quotas and 
exchange controls. Although one of the main objectives was to decrease manufactured 
                                                 
5 See Bruton (1998) for an excellent overview, and which forms the basis of the discussion on import 
substitution here. 
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imports, the net effect was also to discourage exports, in both manufacturing and agriculture, 
inter alia, because of overvalued exchange rates.   
Domestic industry was to be developed by seeking capital and technology from 
abroad, since it was largely accepted at the time that physical capital and know-how could be 
transferred relatively easily through the flow of aid, turn-key projects and the provision of 
technical experts from the north to the south. Indeed, this view was widely held with agencies 
such as the World Bank promoting these technology transfer programmes (Bruton 1998).  
The role of MNEs was seen as a means to actualise the process of technology transfer. 
Investments in most countries were permitted in targeted sectors with the explicit 
understanding that control, ownership and technology would gradually transfer to the 
domestic sector. In addition, intermediate inputs were to be phased out as domestic suppliers 
acquired the competence to meet the (graduated and increasing) local content stipulations that 
were generally included in the investment agreements.  FDI was largely undertaken with the 
intention of supplying the local market, since neighbouring countries had implemented their 
own import substitution programmes.  Captive markets meant that MNEs were able to pass on 
the costs of producing at an inefficient scale. A considerable share of productive assets were 
in state ownership, either as a part of the belief in central planning, or to support large capital 
intensive and scale-intensive projects which the private sector could not afford to maintain.  
Import-substitution policies did lead to economic growth in most developing countries 
during the 1950s and 1960s, and even in the 1970s, although the anticipated growth of 
domestic manufacturing sector did not go quite as planned. This in part reflected the 
application of a similar ISI program in most countries, despite the considerable differences in 
the initial economic structure and industrial development between the various Latin American 
countries. ISI schemes were not adjusted to reflect differences in comparative advantages, but 
sought to duplicate the same breadth of industrial sectors regardless of their initial 
specialisation and resource endowment.  It would seem axiomatic with hindsight that the 
import-substituting experience of countries at different stages of economic development 
would necessarily be different, but this was not acknowledged at the time. Countries as varied 
as Argentina and Peru, for instance, attempted to build up domestic expertise in automobiles 
and chemicals, despite it being the case that less developed countries have – in addition to a 
lower income level – have lower technological capabilities and an economic structure that 
favours resource-intensive and primary sector activities (table 2). The focus on import 
substituting meant that little effort was made to export manufacturing output. Even as late as 
1985, manufacturing exports from Latin America were just 25.1% of all exports, less than half 
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the level in east Asia where manufactures were about 51.7% of exports in the same year. 
Table 3 gives details of the individual countries in the two regions. It is worth noting that 
manufacturing value added as a percentage of GDP was roughly equal in the two regions in 
1985 (Table 3). These figures suggest that domestic acquisition and transfer of technology 
and managerial know-how to the domestic sector was less successful in bringing Latin 
America up to world levels than in east Asia, and productivity of the domestic sector 
persistently lagged that of the Asian countries. Furthermore, although import reduction was 
one of the primary goals of the IS programmes, imports continued to be significant, as 
intermediate and capital goods still had to be imported (Bruton 1998). As late as the 1985, 
manufacturing imports were 61.7% of total imports in Latin America, almost identical as the 
same figure for East Asia and the Pacific (61%).  The one exception was Brazil where 
manufacturing imports accounted for just 37.9% of imports (Table 3). Despite increasing 
awareness of the problems of import substitution and its effective implementation, however, 
many countries continued to pursue these policies, in many instances increasing the role of 
state ownership as a means to increase efficiency and to promote social welfare.  
****TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE*** 
The majority of East Asian economies also implemented similar infant industry 
programs in the 1950s, discouraging foreign ownership wherever possible, and encouraging 
the development of domestic enterprise in much the same way as had Latin American and 
South Asian countries.  While maintaining the basic objective of building up domestic 
manufacturing capacity, Taiwan modified its import substituting regime in the late 1950s, and 
Korea followed suit in the mid-1960s, seeking to encourage exports alongside the primary 
goal of building domestic industrial capacity. These included establishing a realistic exchange 
rate, and creating incentives to export (including subsidies, credit allocation, trade restrictions, 
and reduced or duty free access for imported inputs). Singapore went much further, dropping 
IS policies almost completely around the same time. The ‘New NICs’: Malaysia, Thailand, 
began to move toward a greater export orientation and friendliness towards FDI from the late 
1970s onwards, although still maintaining a strong orientation towards building domestic 
capacity. They were later followed by Indonesia, Philippines, China, India and eventually 
most of Asia. The point here is that all these countries (and later Philippines) pursued 
industrial policies that maintained significant elements of import-substituting regimes until 
(and in some cases, beyond) the 1990s, very much as Latin America has done.  
Thus, it is possible to say that the East Asian countries adopted a more outward-
looking, export-oriented policy orientation at a much earlier period in time than Latin 
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America.  I emphasise the ‘more’ in the last sentence because, as I have highlighted in the 
previous section there is considerable variation. With the possible exception of pre-1997 
Hong Kong, almost all economies in the region have actively sought to intervene to support 
the growth and competitiveness of their domestic sector, alongside their export-orientation6. 
This was done through a variety of means, both by promoting domestic sectors as well as 
restricting imports. At 23.5%, tariff rates were only marginally lower in East Asia than Latin 
America (28.1%) during 1978-80, and by the period 1981-1985, were almost identical. Non-
tariff barriers were in fact almost twice as high in East Asia than in Latin America as late as 
1989-1994 (Hoekman 2002). East Asia can therefore be said to be both export oriented and 
import-substituting (EO-IS) at the same time.   
Latin America, however, adopted the so-called New Economic Model (NEM) only 
reluctantly. Unlike the East Asian ‘miracle’ economies, Latin America did not voluntarily 
seek to move towards promoting an outward orientation in tandem with its import-substituting 
regime, but was pressured into structural adjustment programmes due to problems with 
macroeconomic stability and the ensuing economic crises that engulfed them in the 1980s. To 
be sure, the large state-owned sector many countries was highly inefficient and in dire need of 
reform. However, considerable industrial development had occurred in some of these 
countries, particularly Chile, Argentina and Brazil, and in Asia, Indonesia and India.  This 
made the reformation and opening up of the economy an exercise undertaken with some 
reluctance. Nonetheless, the NEM, which emphasises the free play of market forces both 
domestically and economically, was introduced as part of sweeping policy reforms beginning 
in the mid-1980s. The NEM is part of the new, received wisdom that is focused on tackling 
the deep-rooted causes that underlie market distortions, explicitly reducing state intervention 
such that it is applied exceptionally. The emphasis thus moved away from developing 
domestic capability to enhancing economic efficiency and discipline that market forces were 
supposed to provide (Reinhardt and Peres 2000). They therefore moved much further away 
from import-substitution and domestic capability enhancement, and much more rapidly so 
than did most East Asian economies. The NEM entailed large-scale privatisation of public 
sector activities, rapid dismantling of import and FDI restrictions, and the termination or 
attenuation of state incentives and public goods aimed at enhancing the competitiveness of 
domestic firms.  Thus, the ISI programmes shared much in common with the autonomous 
strategy of Korea and Taiwan, except that in the Asian economies strong state intervention 
                                                 
6 For a succinct discussion of these policies see Amsden (2001), as well as Lall (1996).   
 10
was clearly targeted and coordinated to enhance domestic technological capabilities and 
competitiveness, while at the same time emphasising international markets as a benchmark.  
On the other hand, the NEM and the so-called ISI restructuring strategy went to the other 
extreme: they emphasised international markets and export competitiveness, but withdrew the 
support structure that allowed firms to internalise the spillovers that derived from 
international competition. 
One of the goals of the ISI was to reduce the dependence on natural resources, as well 
as to increase economic independence. This particular objective was never achieved, with 
primary exports accounting for up to 99.6% of the exports of countries such as Bolivia (table 
3) in 1985. The NEM has also not been able to reduce the primary sector dependency of LAC, 
with only marginal changes in the share of the primary sector in value added between 1985 
and 1998 (Table 3). Exports of primary products has declined somewhat in favour of 
manufactured exports, but this probably reflects increased intra-Latin American flows in 
response to the regional integration schemes such as MERCOSUR. This partly explains why, 
despite the increase in the share of primary exports, there has been also general decline in the 
share of value added attributable to manufacturing in almost all Latin American economies. 
Most primary commodities are associated with highly volatile and cyclical markets, as has 
been the case with coffee and copper (among others) in the last decades, and this makes 
countries extremely vulnerable to external shocks due to this volatility.  
Although it is difficult to speak with certainty in this matter, much of the evidence 
suggests that the ISI-to-NEM shift has resulted in a shock of transition, and has not re-
oriented Latin America towards the ‘autonomous model’ or the ‘strategic-FDI dependent 
model’ of East Asia, but away from it. As ECLAC (2001) emphasises, export growth has not 
necessarily resulted to export-led growth. We identify five important problems with the ISI 
restructuring model (as currently enshrined in the NEM doctrine) which have reduced the 
opportunities for duplicating the East Asian success story: 
1. The attenuation of the role of government; 
2. Unreasonable expectations from the liberalisation of FDI for industrial 
development; 
3. The failure to sustain absorptive capacity; 
4. The failure to sequence FDI and domestic capacity in tandem; 
5. The failure to recognise the inertia f transition, and coordination failures. 
 
The next 5 sections deal with these issues.  
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3.1  The attenuation of the role of government 
At the risk of over-generalising, the NEM has reduced the role of the state in Latin 
America to an extent that the crucial point of the autonomous strategy - the role of 
governments in promoting the proactive process of industrial upgrading –has largely been 
ignored. Indeed, the role of the state has been significant in the industrial development 
strategies of the East Asian economies (see e.g., Amsden 1989, Hobday 1995, Wade 1990, 
Lall 1996, Pack 2001).  
Nonetheless, given the debt crises and liquidity problems of Latin America, it needs to 
be acknowledged that the opportunity costs of national governments in pursuing a strategy of 
promoting technological development are quite high, both in terms of creating the necessary 
infrastructure- including clusters of related activities- and of sustaining the requisite macro-
organizational policies and financial incentives over an extended period of time. In the main, 
the smaller and/or poorer developing countries cannot afford to invest in several niches 
simultaneously, and as such the question of technological targeting (i.e., picking the 'right' 
sectors) becomes critical.  
State involvement among the Latin American countries has declined considerably with 
the introduction of the NEM. Perhaps the greatest change has been the reduction in state 
ownership and the subsequent privatisation of assets. Between 1988 and 1999, $107.3 billion 
worth of privatised firms had been acquired through cross-border M&A. The share of Latin 
America and the Caribbean was roughly 79.8% (UNCTAD 2000). In other words, during this 
period, about 20% of the total inflows to this region were associated with privatisation. 
During the period 1999-2000 alone, privatisations totalled US$ 19.5 billion, of which US$4.7 
billion was directed at primary sector firms, and the rest towards services (ECLAC 2001). 
However, there has also been a considerable decline in the provision of public goods by 
governments, and this has affected domestic industry (and particularly smaller firms), which 
has relied on the provision of these facilities (Reinhardt and Peres 2000). Furthermore, the 
state’s involvement has also been reduced in planning.  
In sum, while the change in policy orientation and the subsequent privatisation of 
state-owned enterprises has reduced the interventionist role of governments, their role as 
market facilitator and provider of complementary created asset-based location-specific 
advantages has become more critical (Dunning 1997, Stopford 1997). The lessons from East 
Asian economies, if anything, is not that the role of governments needs to be minimised, but 
that it needs to be judiciously and selectively applied (see e.g., Amden 1989, Wade 1990).  
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Governments play several important roles. The work of Lall (see for instance 1996, 
1997a, 1997b, 2002) points to the need of a holistic approach to selecting and leveraging 
sectors for dynamic growth, for stable governments, transparent policies, and the provision of 
basic infrastructure and skills. The provision of certain basic location advantages is perhaps 
most significant to note, especially for pre-catching up and catching-up economies, where 
firms (foreign and domestic) rely on governments to make available public and quasi-public 
goods. First, they have a passive role in developing the appropriate public and quasi-public 
goods that are the background to economic activity. As countries reach a threshold level of 
technological capabilities and become catching-up economies in earnest, governments need to 
provide more active support through macro-organisational policies. This implies developing 
and fostering specific industries and technological trajectories, such that the location 
advantages they offer are less ‘generic’ and more specific, highly immobile and such that they 
encourage mobile investments to be locked into these assets. In other words, their role as 
market facilitator and provider of complementary created asset-based location-specific 
advantages has become more critical (Dunning 1997, Stopford 1997). 
Another fundamental lesson from the Asian miracle countries tends to be lost amidst 
the focus on openness. Much of East Asia has enjoyed considerable stability in economic 
policy, and this has much to do with political stability. Political stability implies long term 
continuance of economic policy. As Freeman and Lindauer (1999: 20) note (for the case of 
Africa, but which applies equally to Latin America),  
 
'The reason returns to schooling are low..., that capital flight is high and the shift 
towards free trade has not created growth miracles is that schooling, investment 
and trade operate successfully only in a peaceful, stable environment for 
economic activity’.  
 
In other words, it has not necessarily been strong regulation that has detracted the 
development of domestic industry but the lack of consistent regulation7. 
I do not intend to analyse the differences in government intervention between East 
Asia and Latin America in great detail here; this has been examined in considerable detail by 
specialised works on individual countries collectively and singly (see e.g., Rasiah 1995, 
Amsden 1989, 2001, Wong 2002, Lall e.g., 1996).  The basic point that all these studies raise 
are these: technological capacity is central to creating a domestic industrial capacity, and that 
                                                 
7 See also Rodrik (1999) 
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the processes underlying this are complex, slow and need careful nurturing. Knowledge may 
be available through markets, selecting the appropriate technologies and trajectories cannot be 
left solely to market forces. Furthermore, not all knowledge domains can be acquired through 
markets, either because appropriate markets are thin, or because internalisation and efficient 
utilisation are achieved only through learning-by-doing. In other cases, certain knowledge 
domains are more difficult to acquire and efficiently internalise than others, and require 
complementary non-firm assets if they are to be useful.  
The NEM de-emphasises these issues. Knowledge acquisition is left to market forces, 
as is the structure of industry. Knowledge transfer is largely assumed to flow through the 
mechanisms of MNE activity. These are rather nuanced but potentially serious 
misconceptions, which the next section will seek to clarify.  
 
3.2  Technology and industrial development: the limitations of FDI as a driver 
Although it may seem that there has been a fundamental shift in the principles of industrial 
development, the view that technological development and upgrading is central to growth has 
not changed in more than 200 years, predating Schumpeter and Marx8. Indeed, the concept 
that knowledge is easily transferable and is available through efficient markets is rather new, 
and forms the basis of the new orthodoxy reflected in the NEM. As Reinhardt and Peres 
(2000: 1546-7) note,  
“…supporters of the NEM generally pay little explicit attention to the long run 
dynamic consequences of the new productive structure. In particular, there is little 
consideration of the potential impact of on the accumulation of knowledge and 
technological capabilities, factors crucial in to sustained competitiveness in the 
new global economy. There is a tacit presumption that the new productive 
structure, because it rewards efficiency, will lead to a rapid process of ‘learning-
by-doing’ and therefore an expanded endowment of skills and technological 
capabilities. Presumably relative endowments of capital, skill and technology will 
change each country’s comparative advantage towards higher value added 
products.”  
 
Technology (used here as a synonym for knowledge) is cumulative in nature and 
occurs on a firm-level basis. Technological capabilities are developed by the gradual 
accumulation of skills, information and technological effort, and firms will develop their 
technological capabilities in response to market, supply and demand conditions, as well as 
from adapting and imitating other firms in the same or similar markets.  Firms are boundedly 
rational, and prefer to engage in innovatory activities that minimise uncertainty of the 
                                                 
8 See Chang (2002) for a lively (and somewhat provocative) discussion. 
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outcome.  Therefore, innovations tend to be related to its existing technological competences.  
Given this tendency, technology is said to be path-dependent, in that current technological 
competences are a function of its past technological competences. 
Furthermore, technology is localised in nature, not only at a firm-level because of its 
path dependency, but also on a country-specific basis, since cooperation between users and 
producers in the innovatory process is often specific to a given location, and every location 
has different supply and demand conditions. In addition, technology has a partly public good 
nature: although it is relatively less costly to acquire technology than to create it, because of 
its localised nature and its specificity to the innovating firm, there are costs associated for the 
recipient firm to efficiently utilise it in its own environment.  In other words, technology is 
only partially appropriable by other firms, and the extent to which they can do so depends on 
the similarity of their environments and past technological capabilities.  
It is increasingly acknowledged that technological capabilities of firms (and on an 
aggregated level those of countries) define the competitiveness of firms in any given industry. 
Technological capabilities include not only the ability to search and select the most 
appropriate technology to be assimilated from existing ones available- what is normally 
referred to as absorptive capacity- but also the creation of new knowledge through investment 
in R&D.  
These assets can be acquired by several means: through licensing; by indigenous 
development; and through the modality of FDI. Import-substituting programmes in most 
countries have sought to combine arms-length technology imports with indigenous 
development (e.g., Korea9, India), while others sought to combine indigenous development 
with FDI inflows (Taiwan, China, Thailand). In a globalising world it seems clear that there 
are potentially multiple and parallel opportunities for knowledge generation, learning and 
technological accumulation. This is because learning can occur through a variety of 
organisational means (both intra-firm and inter-firm). However, it bears repeating that 
learning and technological accumulation is not costless or instantaneous. Developing and 
sustaining a technological or a competitive advantage is slow, reversible and highly uncertain 
(Narula 2002a).  Likewise, capital can be acquired through other means than FDI. However, 
although inward FDI does not represent the only option available to developing countries, 
                                                 
9 Although strictly speaking Korea minimised the participation of MNEs through FDI in their industrial 
development programme, their development strategy was inherently MNE-dependent, since technologies were 
made available by MNEs in many instances, and were largely dependent on being integrated into the global 
production networks of these MNEs.  
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given their urgency and limited resources it may represent the most efficient option (Narula 
and Dunning 2000). This is for at least four reasons. First, the costs of acquiring technological 
and organisational know-how through arms-length means is an expensive undertaking, and 
given the shortage of capital this option is not open to many developing country governments 
with limited resources. Second, liberalised markets means that firms, ceteris paribus, are 
likely to be more eager to maintain control of their assets and internalise the market for 
themselves, either through wholly owned subsidiary or in a joint venture. Exceptions exist, 
but only where either some strategic reason for the MNE allow for this, the host country has a 
strong bargaining position10, or where the technology has reached the status of a commodity. 
Third, infant industry protection is de rigeur in creating a domestic sector from scratch, and 
protected markets are a limited option within the framework of the NEM. Fourth, the 
resources, complementary clusters and assets necessary to support a viable and strong 
domestic sector are also capital and knowledge intensive. 
Thus, FDI is nowadays regarded as a primary – and explicit - means by which growth 
can be promoted, that the availability of foreign capital and technology is an important means 
for economic catch-up. It is not, however, a sine qua non for development, an idea implicit in 
the Washington consensus, which largely speaking still holds to the view that markets for 
knowledge are efficient, and thus that FDI is the same thing as technology imports (with the 
bonus of including capital flows), and that these technological imports will generate positive 
externalities and spillovers to domestic firms.  
***TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE*** 
FDI flows to Latin America have increased over the last decade as table 4 shows. The 
share of total global FDI stocks to most of the region has increased. Average annual growth 
rate of the regional as a whole is a healthy 42%, greater than the equivalent rate toward Asia 
of 29.8%. Brazil and Argentina in particular have seen rapid and increasing MNE activity. 
However, as noted earlier, a large share of this represents the effect of privatisation and the 
M&A of these formerly state-owned assets by MNEs. From a national perspective, inflows 
from privatisation represent a single, one-off phenomenon - MNE acquisitions through 
privatisation schemes may initially generate a large initial infusion of capital, but subsequent 
inflows are by no means guaranteed. Indeed, in many cases state-owned companies that have 
been most attractive to FDI have often been the more efficient ones, requiring relatively little 
in the way of upgrading. It should be noted that a majority of privatisations are in the services 
                                                 
10 For instance, where the local market is large and the MNE can only get access to other sectors in exchange for 
technology, or lucrative turn-key or other sub-contracts are included. 
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sector. Furthermore, because MNEs intend to generate some rents from these investments, the 
net inflows can be expected to be significantly smaller in subsequent years.  As such, the net 
effect on the economy is possibly neutral, and FDI represents simply a redistribution of assets 
from domestic to foreign capitalists or from the state to foreign firms11.  
It is worth noting that FDI does not automatically lead to positive externalities. 
Furthermore, it is important to realise that MNEs are not in the business of economic 
development. Even where they do seek to transfer knowledge, they prefer to use technologies 
that are suited (first and foremost) to their own needs, and the purposes for which they have 
made the investment. MNEs do not make available their proprietary assets available at the 
whims of governments; rather they tailor their investment decisions to the existing market 
needs, and the relative quality of location advantages (especially skills and capabilities that 
the domestic economy has a comparative advantage in (Lall 2002: 17). Once the decision to 
enter a given market through FDI is taken, the kinds of activity and the level of competence of 
the subsidiary are also co-determined by the nature of the location advantages of the host 
location. That is to say, while MNE internal factors such as their internationalization strategy, 
the role of the new location in their global portfolio of subsidiaries, and the motivation of their 
investment are pivotal in the structure of their investment, they are dependent on the available 
location-specific resources which can be used for that purpose. Even if a host location does 
not have a large domestic market, for instance, an MNE may still engage in local production 
because of import restrictions. Likewise, weak intellectual property rights protection may 
limit an MNE’s involvement in R&D in a host location that may otherwise be an attractive 
location for R&D. The point here is that even at the initial investment stage, the scope of 
activities undertaken in a host location is tempered by the location characteristics. These 
include all aspects of industrial and investment policy, which can determine the kinds of 
incentives provided by the host country, as well as more ‘traditional’ location advantages such 
as market size, agglomeration economies, infrastructure and asset availability.  
The host country’s location advantages play an important role in determining the level 
of competence of the subsidiary (Benito et al 2002), and this is the primary determinant of the 
quality of the FDI. This is for two reasons. First, the level of competence is a function of the 
quality of the location advantages that the host location can provide. High competence levels 
require complementary assets that are non-generic in nature, and are often associated with 
agglomeration effects, clusters, and the presence of highly specialized skills. In other words, 
                                                 
11 Much of the state-owned assets acquired by MNEs are in services and infrastructure.  It needs to be 
acknowledged that such investments have an important welfare effect. 
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firms are constrained in their choice of high competence subsidiaries by resource availability. 
For instance, R&D activities tend to be concentrated in a few locations because the 
appropriate specialized resources are associated with a few specific locations. Second, MNEs 
have been shown to prefer to engage in sequential investment in locations that provide sub-
optimal returns but with which they have prior experience, because firms are known to be 
boundedly rational. Furthermore, while the scope of activities undertaken by a subsidiary can 
be modified more or less instantly, developing competence levels takes time. MNE 
investments in high value-added activities (often associated with high competence levels) 
have the tendency to be ‘sticky’. Such subsidiaries tend to be embedded with the local milieu 
in terms of linkages with suppliers, customers and domestic institutions. The linkages are both 
formal and informal, and will probably have taken years – if not decades – to create and 
sustain. Firms generally dislike radical change, and will prefer to maintain the status quo if it 
does not endanger their competitiveness. When an MNE chooses to exit, it must suffer the 
costs of entry in another location (in terms of effort, capital and time), and these costs are non-
trivial (Narula 2002b). Thus, where the level of competence of the subsidiary is high, they are 
more likely to maintain the subsidiary, even where an alternative location may provide a 
better fit to their overall strategy. It is important, also, to realise that MNEs have a wide 
variety of operations in a variety of countries and locations. The headquarters of an MNE has 
a critical role within its network of subsidiaries, adding value through contributing its own 
expertise as well as by coordinating the flow of knowledge within the network. 
***FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE*** 
It is important to emphasise that the availability of foreign-owned capital (either 
portfolio or direct) for developing countries is not at issue here. There have been capital flows 
of both kinds to viable projects to Latin America, particularly in extractive industries, and 
through privatisation programmes. Indeed, as Figure 1 shows, the share of the primary sector 
in total FDI stocks in the region have increased from 9.6% to 12% between 1988 and 1999. 
While FDI in the manufacturing sector has increased in absolute terms, the share of total 
global FDI stock in the secondary sector located in Latin America has declined from 7.2% to 
4.2% between 1988 and 1999. As Figure 2 shows, the share of global FDI stocks by sector 
located in Latin America increased only in the mining sector, food and beverages and 
precision instruments. With the exception of precision instruments12, the rest of these sectors 
are low value-adding, labour intensive activities. Such activities do not, in general, provide 
                                                 
12 The stock value in this sector was US$239 million in 1999, and probably represents a single investment. 
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much opportunity for technological spillovers and beneficial externalities.  In other words, it 
is not FDI activities that are hard to attract, but certain kinds of FDI. 
***FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE*** 
The lesson I am trying to emphasise is this: FDI inflows are not a guarantee of 
growth. FDI and economic development are highly correlated phenomena, but both are 
strongly dependent on the specific resources, institutions, economic structure, political 
ideologies and social and cultural fabric of countries. The kind of FDI activity a country 
might attract (or wish to attract), too, at different stages of development, are different 
(Dunning and Narula 1996, Narula 1996, Narula and Dunning 2000).  The motive of the 
investment is crucial in determining the extent to which linkages and externalities develop.  
It is generally acknowledged that there are four main motives for investment: to seek 
natural resources; to seek new markets; to restructure existing foreign production through 
rationalisation, and to seek strategically related created assets. In general, less developed 
countries are unlikely to attract much asset-augmenting FDI. Such investment is primarily an 
activity undertaken in pre-frontier sharing stage and upwards (Table 2). While there has been 
an increase in the location of asset-augmentation activity in some developing countries during 
the last decade, this continues to be the exception rather than the rule. This is simply because 
the human resources, technological capabilities and organisational skills that these countries 
(or their firms) possess, tend to be in relatively low-technology and natural resource intensive 
sectors which have become 'generic' over time (Dunning et al 1998). Indeed, it is often the 
case that developing country MNEs locate subsidiaries in major clusters of activity in 
locations in industrialised countries in order to augment their own ownership advantages. 
There are exceptions to this generalisation, for instance, where a MNE has established a 
location as a regional centre (such as Unilever’s use of Thailand as a specialist regional R&D 
centre for personal products) or in rare cases, where immobile locational advantages is in the 
form of a cluster of highly skilled but relatively inexpensive labour that helps complement the 
intellectual capital and markets of MNEs, as in the case of Bangalore in India for the design 
of software. 
 
Resource seeking FDI 
Resource seeking FDI is a case where existing national technological assets and 
knowledge infrastructure do not play a significant role in determining FDI inflows. Where a 
region or country possesses an absolute advantage in a given scarce resource, it is in a strong 
position to extract rent from the MNE, despite the absence of infrastructure or a domestic 
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sector. Where the resource sought is a natural one, the marginal cost of its extraction to both 
parties is close to zero. As such, the location is able to generate economic rent depending on 
the resource's rarity and accessibility in other locations. Most other resources, where the 
advantage is a comparative one, do not maintain a steadily low marginal cost to governments. 
The cost of utilising such resources rises relative to other locations as it moves to higher 
levels of development. The case of unskilled labour is one example. The location of labour 
intensive production becomes steadily less attractive to an MNE as the costs of this input rise, 
particularly so where productivity improvements fail to match wage cost increases. The 
leverage in such cases lies increasingly with the MNE, as cross-market liberalisation may 
enable numerous other locations in several countries to offer similar ‘generic’ and (easily) 
replicable L advantages (McIntyre et al 1996).  
Resource-seeking investment generally (but not always) implies low-value adding 
activity and low capital expenditure on plant and equipment (extractive industries being the 
exception), FDI is less ‘sticky’, i.e., more footloose. A purely resource-seeking investment is 
not normally tightly integrated into the investing firm’s organisational structure: indeed 
MNEs rarely engage in complete internalisation of raw material markets; they prefer instead 
to conclude non-equity agreements with foreign firms, or purchase their inputs at arms-length 
prices.  
In general, FDI in LDCs (pre-catching-up stage) is often almost entirely resource 
seeking (Table 2). Since there are few other L advantages to offer MNEs, this is often the only 
kind of FDI present. Where vertical forward integration and further value adding does occur, 
either to exploit markets or to access other L advantages, the ‘stickiness’ of the investment 
increases. Both market-seeking and efficiency seeking investment imply higher integration 
within the MNE, and a higher level of commitment as well as a higher degree of embedment. 
Due to the liberalisation and deregulation associated with the NEM, a considerable portion of 
the investment in primary sector has been resource seeking in nature, particularly in countries 
such as Venezuela Columbia, Argentina and Peru (Mortimore 2000), as illustrated in Table 5. 
 
****TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE****  
 
Market-seeking FDI 
Market seeking FDI only gains prominence in situations where the local or adjacent 
markets provide access to significant opportunities to achieve production economies of scale. 
This requires not only a sizeable population, but also the ability of the market to support 
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(within a reasonable time frame) the expected demand on which the investment is based. In 
addition though, there is often a ‘follow-the-leader’ strategic response by other firms, 
whereby a market that might have supported two or three competitors is inundated with a 
larger number of new entrants than the market can efficiently support. The case of both the 
Chinese and the Indian automobile market represent examples of such a scenario, where 
despite the potential for high demand levels, few participants are actually able to make a 
profit. This is not the case with all sectors – investments in food and personal products for 
instance are much more likely to achieve economies of scale, since these products have a 
relatively low income elasticity of demand. Indeed, the automobile industry represents a 
special case in many developing countries, for what is now described as aggressive market-
seeking investments in developing countries in many cases began life as defensive import-
substituting investments. These were only permitted under certain stringent conditions, but the 
MNE normally expected to have access to a captive protected market in return. Much of the 
original FDI into Latin America prior during the ISI period was primarily of this nature. 
Market seeking investments are the primary motive behind much of the investment in 
chemicals in Brazil, as well as the agro-industry in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. The 
deregulation of the services sector has resulted in rapid growth in FDI in financial services, 
energy and telecommunications (table 5).  
Market seeking FDI, by it nature, is based on a single central locational advantage. Its 
presence or absence is stage-dependent, but is essentially an exogenous event, with one 
exception. Membership of a free trade area allows countries that have small domestic markets 
to expand their de facto market size.  In such situations, however, several formerly sovereign 
markets become integrated, and the choice of location then rests on other location advantages. 
To some extent, the establishment of MERCOSUR has resulted in some redistribution of FDI 
within the MERCOSUR countries, but largely speaking, it remains market seeking in nature.  
 
Efficiency seeking and strategic asset-seeking FDI 
These two types of investment are similar in that they both normally require a certain 
threshold level of created assets, and are generally regarded as being associated with the 
process of globalisation. It is no surprise that they are generally associated with countries at 
middle-income and industrialising countries, and in the case of asset-seeking FDI, with the 
industrialised countries.  
As such, efficiency seeking investment in the least developed countries is an 
ambiguous concept, although, for many years, MNEs have engaged in export-oriented 
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resource-seeking investment, which is de facto efficiency-seeking FDI. Moreover, efficiency 
investment - in the sense that different aspects of manufacturing activity are located in 
particular locations to exploit the economies of cross-border specialisation and the uneven 
distribution of immobile created assets- is a relatively new phenomenon. In addition, 
efficiency seeking investment is associated with particular sectors with particular 
characteristics. These sectors are those dominated by firms which have integrated global 
networks which are highly dependent on cost-minimisation on a global basis. That is, they 
seek to maintain their cost competitiveness by breaking up the value chain so as to locate 
production to seek the most efficient location and thereby the lowest overall cost. Such 
industries include apparel, electronics and automobiles (See Sturgeon and Lester 2002, 
Humphrey et al 1998).  
In both of these types of investments, the role of sub-national clusters and the 
agglomeration of related activities is significant. The externalities available to countries that 
are home to centres of agglomeration, or possess the necessary science and technology 
infrastructure necessary to attract asset-augmenting FDI, are considerably different from 
countries which primarily attract asset-exploiting FDI. It should be noted that even where 
centres of excellence or agglomeration exist in a given industry, this does not imply that 
further knowledge intensive investments will be attracted to the same location by virtue of a 
single cluster existing, unless clear spillovers or externalities exist. Nonetheless, countries that 
have (the basis for) agglomerative economies are the ones likely to receive such FDI. This 
was originally the case for export processing zones (EPZs). It now applies to higher value 
adding activities – even in intermediate countries such as India- but only where such location 
advantages are perceived by MNEs to efficiently complement their own core competences. 
There are three sectors that have benefited from increased FDI flows due to an 
efficiency-seeing motive on the part of MNEs in the NEM namely, apparel, automobiles and 
electronics (Table 5) (Mortimore 2000). Mexico has perhaps been the greatest beneficiary, 
due largely (if not wholly) to its membership of NAFTA. US MNEs have relocated much of 
the lower value adding activities to Mexico in automobiles, electronics and apparel. Likewise, 
the Caribbean basin countries, due to special access to the US market as well as the Caribbean 
basin initiative, have also benefited from US firms seeking to achieve efficiency in the face of 
increased competition from Asian firms. Mortimore (2000) argues persuasively that these 
activities have resulted in creating export platforms for the MNEs, with limited benefits for 
the host countries involved (for a more in-depth discussion, see ECLAC 2001).  
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The automobile sector in Brazil is also increasingly integrated into the global 
production networks of MNEs. Brazil invested heavily in promoting domestic capability in 
the automobile sector during the ISI period, particularly towards promoting domestic 
suppliers and value of local content by the foreign-owned MNEs which had dominated the 
auto sector. With liberalisation, many of the domestic suppliers have been integrated into the 
global production networks (either independently or having been acquired by MNEs 
themselves) as the Brazilian subsidiaries of these MNEs have themselves been re-integrated 
into their global efficiency seeking structure (Humphrey et al 1998).  
 
It is important to note that many of the smaller and less efficient automobile 
component suppliers in Brazil have been unable to survive the transition to liberalised markets 
and global competition. But Brazilian domestic firms have weathered the transition better than 
many other domestic firms from less successful former import-substitutors. Complete 
liberalisation and the unrestricted flow of FDI has potentially negative effects for a 
developing country without the appropriately endowed domestic sector. Liberalisation does 
indeed allow for a more efficient use of a country’s resources. However, it remains a basic 
objective of most country’s industrial policy to build up a competitive domestic sector. The 
indiscriminate FDI policies of most developing countries has resulted in a crowding-out of 
domestic investment (Agosin and Mayer 2000). Thus, liberalisation and the free flow of 
inward FDI can result in an FDI-dominated economy, with limited opportunity for domestic 
industry growth, particularly in least developed countries. From a purely economic efficiency 
perspective it may well be the case that FDI is pareto-optimal: FDI-dominated production is 
certainly better than no production at all (Narula 2002c).  
 
 
3.3  The development of the domestic sector: sustaining absorptive capacity 
It seems rather facile to highlight this, but for an FDI-assisted development strategy there 
needs to be an appropriate complementary domestic sector to support the FDI, and secondly, 
their need to be domestic firms with the capacity to learn from the MNEs. To paraphrase Lall 
(2002), an MNC dependent export strategy needs a proactive element for dynamic 
competitiveness.  Indeed, the presence and condition of the domestic sector is crucial. If no 
domestic sector were to exist (say, in an LDC) there can no opportunity to absorb spillovers 
from FDI: In a perfectly liberalised world, MNEs have no incentive to encourage the 
development of domestic firms in (say) an LDC to meet their needs because other MNEs may 
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be able to do so more efficiently, either through imports or FDI. In an extreme case, there may 
actually be no FDI inflow, because MNEs will prefer to locate production in a regionally 
optimal location, and simply import. Thus, FDI in a completely liberalised milieu does not 
necessarily lead to growth in the domestic sector.  The benefits of FDI only occur when there 
is domestic investment, and where the domestic investment has the ability to internalise the 
externalities from FDI.  
The lesson for Latin American economies derives from the need to invest in 
absorptive capacity. It is a necessary condition for MNE-assisted economic upgrading that a 
domestic sector exist which is capable of taking advantage of the linkages and spillovers that 
derive from MNEs. A second necessary condition is that the domestic sector (whether firm or 
non-firm) possess the necessary skills and competence to maximise the internalisation of the 
opportunities that become available through spillovers and linkages. In other words, firms 
must possess the necessary absorptive capacity. Absorptive capacity is about the ability to 
absorb available knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1989), and on an aggregate level, it 
represent define national absorptive capacity as “the ability to learn and implement the 
technologies and associated practices of already developed countries” (Dahlman and Nelson 
1995). 
Absorptive capacity supports further accumulation of technological knowledge, and 
technological advances support the further development of absorptive capacity in a 
cumulative, interactive and virtuous process during the catching-up stage. However, this 
virtuous circle of technological accumulation takes place only if an “adequate” minimum 
level of absorptive capacity is initially present. This threshold level of absorptive capacity is 
most significantly associated with the development of what Rasiah (2002) terms ‘basic 
infrastructure’, which represent ‘generic’ location advantages. Acquiring and sustaining this 
threshold level of absorptive capacity occurs in the ‘pre-catching-up’ stage (Criscuolo and 
Narula 2002).  In this respect much of Latin America does quite well, as Table 6 shows. I 
have included only one indicator (telephone lines per 1000 inhabitants), and Latin America 
compares quite favourably with much of Asia.  
***Table 6 ABOUT HERE*** 
However, progress towards more technology-intensive manufacturing activities 
depends on the existence of ‘high tech infrastructure’ (Rasiah 2002). This type of 
infrastructure is key if firms are to be able to internalise and absorb externally generated 
technologies, and to create their own. Such infrastructure plays an important role in 
promoting the innovatory and absorptive capacity of firms. It also acts as a mechanism to 
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‘direct’ technology strategy and as a mechanism to overcome market failure.  It is important 
to understand that while learning and absorption takes place at the firm level, but the success 
or failure of individual firms occurs in orchestration with an entire ‘system’. Within any 
system, there exists a broader non-firm-specific knowledge base within what might best be 
described as ‘non-firm actors’ that are crucial to a country-level understanding of the process 
of technological accumulation. Non-firm actors determine the knowledge infrastructure that 
supplements and supports firm-specific innovation. I define ‘knowledge infrastructure’ in the 
sense proposed by Smith (1997) as being ‘generic, multi-user and indivisible’ and consisting 
of public research institutes, universities, organisations for standards, intellectual property 
protection, etc that enables and promotes science and technology development. They account 
for a certain portion of the stock of knowledge at the national level which may be regarded as 
‘general knowledge’ in the sense that it has characteristics of a public good, and potentially 
available to all firms that seek to internalise it for rent generation. Thus, it is possible to speak 
of national technological or competitive advantages, which is not simply the sum of the firms, 
but the synergistic effect of all these players within a given industry within boundaries of a de 
facto region or country (Criscuolo and Narula 2002). 
Absorptive capacity is also about the creation of the appropriate quality and quantity 
of human capital. However, while human capital represents a core aspect of absorptive 
capacity, its presence per se is not a sine qua non for knowledge accumulation. Human capital 
represents a subset of absorptive capabilities. While both physical and human capital are 
necessary inputs for catching-up, the lack of appropriate incentives for production and 
investment can compromise the success of the technological upgrading (Lall, 1992). Table 6 
gives details of the number of tertiary –level students in several of the countries, and while 
there is considerable variation, Latin America performs well in this respect too. The 
availability of a large stock of suitably qualified workers does not in itself result in efficient 
absorption of knowledge. This requires the presence of institutions and economic actors 
within industry which defines the stock of knowledge in a given location, and the efficient use 
of markets and hierarchies, be they intra-firm, intra-industry or intra-country. This knowledge 
is not costless, and must be accumulated over time. Important externalities arise which 
impinge on the ease of diffusion and efficiency of absorption and utilisation of external 
knowledge.  
Absorptive capacity is therefore also concerned with the efficient use of 
knowledge acquired. Firms need the ability to use prior knowledge in the solution of practical 
problems that are commercially viable. Thus, absorptive capacity implies problem-solving 
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skills that emerge directly as a result of attempts to assimilate external knowledge. These 
efforts represent a potential for learning how to undertake different activities through 
investing in R&D, i.e. to create new knowledge, and is referred to as the process of ‘learning 
to learn’. Absorptive capacity accumulates only if an effort to internalise the external 
knowledge is exerted and in particular if the prior-knowledge has been applied to the solution 
of problems. Table 6 gives details of the Business expenditures in R&D (BERD) as a 
percentage of GDP. Much of Latin America woefully under performs in this respect with the 
exception of Brazil. Table 7 gives data on US patent applications, which indicates that while 
patenting activity by domestic firms in Latin America (particularly Argentina, Brazil, 
Venezuela and Mexico) prior to NEM, was considerably lower than Korea and Taiwan, it was 
on par with the second-tier Asian economies. Since liberalisation, however, levels of 
patenting have not kept pace with Asia.  
***TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE*** 
An important point that is often lost to policy makers is that absorption is not purely 
about imitation. Firms cannot absorb outside knowledge unless they invest in their own R&D, 
because it can be highly specific to the originating firm and be partly tacit in nature. In 
addition, absorptive capacity is assumed to be a function of firm’s R&D efforts, as well as the 
degree to which outside knowledge corresponds to the firm’s needs, and the general 
complexity of external knowledge. 
Absorptive capacity is not constant along the converging path: it evolves with the level 
of technological development (Criscuolo and Narula 2002). Different countries at different 
distances from the frontier acquire and assimilate technological spillovers using different 
modalities. During the catching-up phase, absorptive capacity is predominately directed at 
assimilating spillovers originated from trade and/or inward FDI. This strategy was 
fundamental to the rapid growth of the Asian newly industrialising economies during the 
1970s and 1980s, and countries such as Malaysia and China more recently. At the pre-
frontier-sharing phase (as well as at the frontier) increases in the knowledge base occur 
primarily through an active engagement in accessing to foreign located technological 
spillovers, through outward FDI-related R&D, joint ventures and strategic alliances. This has 
been the strategy of the Asian NICs since the 1990s.  
As they approach the frontier, countries must have the capacity not just to absorb and 
imitate technological development created by others, but also the ability to generate 
inventions of their own. This requires technological capabilities that are non-imitative. In 
other words, learning-by-doing and learning-by-using have decreasing returns as one 
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approaches the frontier, and in-house learning and learning–by-alliances become more 
efficient options. The case of Korea (Amsden 1989, Kim 1995, Sachwald 2001) illustrates the 
evolution of the ability to assimilate R&D spillovers during the catching-up process. Korea 
relied on technology licensing and imports of capital goods from developed countries in 
acquiring external knowledge till the 1980s, but this enabled it only to access second-best 
practice technologies. Korea is at the pre-frontier sharing or frontier-haring phase in several 
sectors.  Its domestic technological capabilities (inter alia deriving from its education system) 
are however geared towards absorption through imitation rather than in-house learning (see 
Kim 1995, Suh 2000). In addition, the difficulty of further assimilation connected to the more 
tacit nature of advanced knowledge and the reluctance of industrialised countries to transfer 
technology to Korean firms for fear of losing their technological advantage has aggravated 
this process. There is now an increasing emphasis technological capability building and on 
reverse technology transfer, that is, through outward FDI by Korean MNEs (Sachwald 2001, 
Lee 2001). 
 
3.4  The importance of promoting FDI and domestic capacity concurrently.  
It is true that the determinants of economic development are similar to the 
determinants of FDI, but this does not mean that there is a simple cause and effect between 
them. Particular types of FDI tend to be attracted to countries with certain levels of economic 
development and appropriate economic structures. But simply to ‘pump’ a country full of FDI 
will not lead to its catapulting to a higher stage of development.  To assume FDI drives 
economic development is to assume that FDI is about capital, and that the lack of economic 
growth is about the lack of liquidity. The lesson from the Asian economies is that FDI and 
domestic capability need to be concatenated and pursued in tandem (Ozawa 1995, 1996).  
This, more than anything, is the lesson that can be learnt from the ‘flying geese paradigm’ 
proposed by Akamatsu and adapted to the issue of FDI by Kojima (e.g., 1990) and Ozawa 
(e.g., 1996).   
Of course, the circumstances associated with the flying geese paradigm are somewhat 
unique to Asia, as well as the geo-political dynamics of that particular time period. First, 
Japan’s acted as the driver of this process, and its own rapid upgrading required it to seek 
alternative locations to establish operations. Latin America did not have the benefit of such a 
 27
driver13. Second, the cold war and US military efforts first in Korea, and later in Vietnam 
helped spur demand for local manufacturing. US trade policies were also favourably disposed 
towards exports from many of the friendly countries in the region. Third, at the time, Latin 
America, Africa and much of the rest of Asia were engaged in IL-IS policies. This meant that 
when MNEs (whether European, US or Japanese) needed to relocate labour-intensive 
production and to seek to import these intermediate goods, there were just a handful of 
countries which had both the technological capabilities and an appropriate export-friendly 
orientation to do so from. In other words, MNEs had only a few choices, and this resulted in a 
high concentration of investment in these locations. Transferring technology to local suppliers 
was a very acceptable cost to MNEs, and this created a virtuous circle of technological 
accumulation: the better the technological capabilities of domestic firms got, the higher the 
local productivity and the greater the benefits to the MNEs. Fourth, these Asian economies 
were natural resource-poor, unlike Latin America. As I have discussed in an earlier section, 
MNE subsidiaries tend to display inertia in their operations. Their operations in Asia did not 
represent forward integration from existing local resource-seeking investments, and began 
from a clean slate. In the case of Japanese firms, they already had some experience with many 
of these Asian economies from their pre-war and wartime economic and military activities. 
Even where MNEs were not deterred by the IS-IL orientation, Sequential investments in Latin 
America sought to add value to resource based initial investments and tended to remain low-
value adding. Fifth (but somewhat related to the last point) that the East Asian countries 
focused on developing electronics and transport equipment sectors was somewhat 
serendipitous.   
The process of development and the role of FDI varies between countries and 
industries because of the various economic and industrial policy options selected. Industrial 
policy where certain industries are selected for rapid growth by focused investments through 
intensive development of created assets can and do accelerate economic development. The 
examples of both the more advanced industrialised countries (such as the NICs) and the 
second tier emerging economies, particularly Malaysia and Brazil illustrate this. Attracting 
specialised FDI to a particular sector can alter the sequence of industrial upgrading 
(Williamson and Hu 1994), because specialised FDI may help improve the created assets 
associated within a sector (say consumer electronics production). Created assets in this one 
                                                 
13 Reinhardt and Peres (2000) argue that a clear distinction can be made between countries north and south of 
Panama along the same lines: Countries North of Panama have the advantage of geographical proximity to the 
US, and US policies have actively promoted trade and investment with these countries.  
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sector may have significant knowledge flows externalities in another (say micro-electronics 
design), which in turn may represent significant input to another sector (say software 
development). But this assumes the presence of a virtuous circle, and the development of 
appropriate clusters.  
FDI-assisted growth requires the capacity to be a ‘strategic follower’ (Ramos 2000). 
This requires a systematic understanding of what technological capabilities need to be 
developed or enhanced, and to seek to actively coordinate potential users with sources of the 
appropriate technologies. Asian governments that pursued an autonomous strategy actively 
sought to identify, acquire and transfer technologies, with government agencies acting as 
market-makers. Left to their own means, firms have a tendency to be risk averse, and to avoid 
the financial and technological risk of upgrading their technological assets as long as these 
provide a reasonable rate of return. This short-term myopia is not unique to Latin American 
firms: governments in Asia – and particularly in Japan, Korea and Taiwan – sought to 
overcome or at least reduce the perceived risk levels by providing subsidised loans and other 
incentives to domestic firms that restructured their existing operations by adopting new 
technologies in the products and processes that promoted international best practise14.  
The countries with the most successful technological upgrading – Korea, Taiwan and 
to a lesser extent Brazil – allocated subsidies in what Amsden and Hikino (2000) and Amsden 
(2001) call a ‘reciprocal control mechanism’. That is, incentives and subsidies whether to 
upgrade technologically, promote local content, expand exports or reduce import-dependence 
were subject to performance standards that were actively monitored, and in Amsden’s (2001) 
words, were ‘redistributive in nature and results-oriented’ and acted to prevent government 
failure.  
To be sure, upgrading of technological capabilities of domestic firms can no longer be 
pursued in quite the same way in a globalised world. International competition is a given, and 
there can be no return to the infant industry model of the IS-IL era.  While Latin American 
countries such as Brazil had considerable investment in R&D, a majority of the formal R&D 
efforts were conducted by state-owned enterprises and the non-firm sector. While the role of 
the state must necessarily remain a significant investor in innovation, these policies need to be 
orchestrated with the private firm sector, whether domestic or foreign.  
 
                                                 
14 Ramos (2000) expands on this theme (pp 1712-3), and discusses how such programmes were also used widely 
in Europe as part of the Marshall plan.  
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3.5  Coordination failures: the inertia of transition  
There are many unique problems that derive directly from the policy volte-face that 
the switch from import substitution to NEM implies. The social costs of reformation, resource 
reallocation and structural adjustment on such a large scale resulted in considerable social 
unrest.  Among other things, I want to highlight the inertia of institutions to successfully 
switch from one policy orientation to another. 
Likewise Korea and Taiwan’s (as is also the case with Japan) policies also evolved 
over 40 years, while Latin American economies have attempted to rapidly restructure since 
the late 1980s. This represents a rapid transition, exceeded only by the formerly centrally 
planned European economies. 
 Latin American countries find themselves in a new multilateral milieu, but one in 
which they have little experience. They have hitherto operated their economies on a national 
basis, and by looking inward they have been able to minimise exposure to external shocks. 
Institutions continue to remain largely independent and national. By institutions I mean the 
‘sets of common habits, routines, established practises, rules, or laws that regulate the 
interaction between individuals and groups’ (Edquist and Johnson 1997). Institutions create 
the milieu within which economic activity is undertaken and establish the ground rules for 
interaction between the various economic actors, and represent a sort of a ‘culture’. 
Institutions are both formal and informal, and will probably have taken years – if not decades 
– to create and sustain. To modify and develop institutions is a complex and slow process, 
particularly since they cannot be created simply by government fiat. Such change is even 
more complex where the new institutions require synchronisation between countries. The 
Triad countries have taken 50 years to adjust and reform institutions, but even here there is 
inertia. The EU, for instance, has failed to reform its agricultural sector. Norway remains 
largely mired in an import-substituting world, with a strong tendency towards central planning 
and state-owned economic actors (Narula 2002c). 
 Liberalisation is an important force in economic globalisation since it requires a 
multilateral view on hitherto-domestic issues and promotes interdependence of economies. It 
is implicit within this view that FDI and MNE activity can be undertaken with much greater 
ease than previously. This view is enforced because countries have explicitly sought to 
encourage MNE activity as a source of much-needed capital and technology. In addition to 
financial crises, the general warming of the attitudes towards FDI emanate from an 
accelerating pace of technical change and the emergence of integrated production networks of 
MNEs (Lall 2000).  
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On the other hand, the establishment of the World Trade Organisation, and the 
preceding GATT rounds, which encouraged liberalisation, have in fact acted as an important 
force in establishing common rules and frameworks.  Certainly, the various agreements within 
WTO have serious ramifications for member countries. In principle WTO agreements 
encourage an easier flow of technology and knowledge, and more alternative sources. Also, 
firms situated in LDCs potentially have greater (and less impeded) access to important 
markets such as those of the OECD countries (Lall 1997b).  
Nonetheless, liberalisation (among other forces related to the Washington Consensus) 
has acted as a major ‘shock’ to the institutions within most countries, since it has introduced 
not just new economic actors (MNEs), but it has also required major restructuring of existing 
institutions (legal codes, political structures, policy orientation). Despite the view of the 
Washington Consensus, the exposure of these economies to the vagaries of international 
competition suddenly will not necessarily facilitate their institutional setting (as best 
illustrated by the chaotic state of the ex-soviet economies). As Kogut (2000: 34) notes: 
Institutions, however, do not travel by the arteries of multinational 
corporations. They reflect patterns of behaviour that are inscribed in legal 
codes and political and economic relationships. Outside the power of any one 
actor to change, institutions are social agreements that guide and coordinate 
the interdependent acts of economic actors in a country. 
 
 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Apart from the two approaches representing different ideological positions, the ISI approach 
adopted by Latin America and the autonomous strategy of East Asia shared many important 
and fundamentally important features in common. Both espoused the development of 
domestic industrial capacity through a concatenation of foreign technologies (through 
technology imports and FDI) and domestic competitiveness. Both sought to enhance 
absorptive capacity and promote infrastructure. Indeed, the autonomous strategy favoured by 
Korea and Taiwan was as much about import substitution as it was about promoting exports. 
The two approaches - in hindsight - also differed in several important respects. These include 
disagreements about the rapidity of learning, and an underestimation the costs and the 
difficulties of internalising technological spillovers. Perhaps most significantly, however, was 
the failure to implement reciprocal control mechanisms and international competition to target 
competitiveness against international norms, which export-orientation allowed the East Asian 
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economies to do. Countries such as Brazil that targeted international markets in certain 
industries, did in fact achieve similar levels of technological competitiveness to the Asian 
countries in certain areas (Viotti 2002, Amsden 2001,). Such gains may well be dissipated in 
the face of rapid liberalisation, as indeed Humphrey et al (1998) seem to suggest. 
 The switch from ISI to NEM in Latin America does not bode well for the prospects for 
industrial development. While the NEM model has helped corrected many inefficiencies, inter 
alia, improving important macro-economic fundamentals, and reducing the excessive role of 
the state in domestic industrial activity, it has also led to a rapid and overzealous reduction in 
the state’s involvement in the provision of public and quasi public goods which are necessary 
conditions for industrial development (Ramos 2000, Katz 2001, Alcorta and Peres 1998, 
Alcorta 2000). 
 Market forces cannot substitute for the role of governments in developing and 
promoting a proactive industrial policy. Firms necessarily take a shorter term, profit 
maximising view because they are largely risk averse. MNEs and unrestrained flows of 
inward FDI may well lead to an increase in productivity and exports, but they do not 
necessarily result in increased competitiveness of the domestic sector or increased industrial 
capacity, which ultimately determines economic growth in the long run. FDI per se does not 
provide growth opportunities unless a domestic industrial sector exists which has the 
necessary technological capacity to profit from the externalities from MNE activity. This is 
well illustrated by the inability of many Asian countries which have relied on a passive FDI-
dependent strategy to upgrade their industrial development. Furthermore, infant industry 
protection is still largely irreplaceable, since unrestrained FDI may result in ‘crowding out’ of 
the domestic sector. FDI and domestic capabilities and a domestic sector need to be 
concatenated and properly phased if positive results can be achieved. The lesson from East 
Asia is not that the role of governments should be substituted by the market, but that markets 
and governments can co-exist. 
 I should emphasise that I am not advocating a return to import substitution 
industrialisation in the traditional sense. Nor is this possible. Globalisation is largely 
irreversible, and cross-border competition does indeed help reduce inefficiencies. 
Nonetheless, there is no tangible developmental alternative to building up domestic 
capabilities. The concept of promoting catch-up through infant industry promotion has always 
been the bedrock of industrial development policies and catch-up (see Chang 2002 for a 
recent discussion).  
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 However, catching-up implies the absorption and mastery of existing knowledge, and 
this implies that there must be a body of knowledge available for imitation, and that domestic 
firms must have the capability to internalise these assets. Agreements within the WTO 
framework such as TRIPs, TRIMs and SCM severely limit the potential for developing 
countries to utilise traditional policy instruments, effectively reducing opportunities for 
domestic industrial capacity.  
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Table 1, Selected Indicators, Selected Asian and Latin American Countries, 1998  
GDP per capita  Population, total Surface area FDI, net inflows Industry, VA High-tech exports  Mobile phones 
1998 (constant 1995 US$) (sq km) (% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of mfg exports) (per 1,000 people) 
Asia 
Hong Kong, Ch 21801 6645600 .. .. 15.2 21.1 476.7
Indonesia 975 203678368 1,904,570.00 -0.4 44.9 10.4 5.2
Korea, Rep. 11022 46430000 99,260.00 1.7 43.8 27.1 301.7
Malaysia 4380 22180000 329,750.00 3 43.6 54.9 101.4
Singapore 25297 3923000 620 6.6 35.4 59.1 281.7
Thailand 2629 59793500 513,120.00 6.5 38.8 34.4 32.8
Vietnam 330 76520000 331,690.00 7.3 32.6 .. 2.9
China 725 1242179968 9,598,050.00 4.6 49.3 15.5 19
India 431 979672896 3,287,590.00 0.6 25.7 5.6 1.2
Pakistan 500 131582000 796,100.00 0.8 23.8 0.1 1.6
Sri Lanka 789 18778000 65,610.00 1.3 27.5 .. 9.4
Latin America 
Argentina 8474 36125000 2,780,400.00 2.2 28.7 6 70.1
Bolivia 972 7950000 1,098,580.00 11.2 18.7 .. 30
Brazil 4501 165814784 8,547,400.00 4.1 28.8 9.6 46.7
Chile 5247 14821700 756,630.00 6.4 34.2 3.7 65.1
Costa Rica 3765 3526000 51,100.00 4.4 30.6 .. 28.4
Colombia 2404 40804000 1,138,910.00 3 27 8.8 45.6
El Salvador 1727 6035000 21,040.00 9.2 27.6 7.8 17.6
Guatemala 1531 10799000 108,890.00 3.5 20 7.2 10.3
Jamaica 1712 2576000 10,990.00 5.3 31.5 .. 30.9
Mexico 3540 95252432 1,958,200.00 2.7 28.5 19.3 35
Nicaragua 452 4794380 130,000.00 8.7 21.6 5.4 3.9
Paraguay 1787 5219000 406,750.00 2.3 27 3.9 44.4
Trinidad and T 4651 1285140 5,130.00 11.9 38.8 1.4 20.5
Venezuela, RB 3531 23242000 912,050.00 4.7 35.3 2.6 87.1
Source: World Development Indicators, 2001
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Table 2: relating the catch-up process to motivations for FDI 
   
 
Technological 
and absorptive 
capabilities  
Pre-catching-up 
stage Natural 
resource based, 
commodity exports. 
No technological 
capabilities Little or 
no basic 
infrastructure.  
Underdeveloped 
institutions Few 
domestic firms with 
technological 
capabilities: Little 
or no inward FDI 
 
No outward FDI 
 
Catching-up 
stage ‘generic’  
basic infrastructure. 
Growing capacity to 
imitate. Engaged in 
low-value adding 
manufacturing, often 
as OEM supplier. 
Growth of domestic 
industry in support 
and related sectors. 
little outward FDI  
Growing inward FDI 
 
Pre-frontier sharing 
stage. Increasingly 
specialised 
knowledge 
infrastructure, 
Decline in potential to 
imitate and adapt, 
Increasing integration 
into efficiency based 
global production 
networks. Strong 
domestic industry, 
move towards OBM. 
Increasing use of 
networking to achieve 
modularity.  
Rising inward FDI 
rising outward FDI 
Frontier-sharing stage: Technological 
opportunities primarily rest on long-term 
innovation and collaboration. Pushing back 
frontiers of knowledge. Considerable in-house 
R&D activity by both domestic and foreign 
MNEs. Outward FDI to augment domestic 
capacity. Growing use of R&D alliances and 
networking. Strong knowledge infrastructure 
 
Growing use of outsourcing to earlier stage 
countries of lower-value added activities. 
Economic 
structure 
Industrial 
upgrading and 
manufacturing 
comparative 
advantage 
evolution 
 
Motives for FDI Resource-seeking 
investment- L 
advantages limited 
to natural resource 
endowments.  
 
 
 decliningResource-seeking 
FDI, but growing L 
advantages, 
particularly unskilled 
labour and 
infrastructure attracts 
labour intensive 
manufacturing 
Growing presence of 
market-seeking FDI 
Market-seeking FDI, 
and increasing 
efficiency seeking 
FDI in 
manufacturing, as L 
advantages become 
increasingly created 
asset-based 
declining
 Mfg sector
increasing 
Primary 
sectorincreasing 
Service 
sectorHecksher Ohlin sectorsUndifferentiated Smithian  Differentiated Smithian sectorsInnovation-intensive Schumpeterian sectors Developing countriesEfficiency seeking FDI, market-seeking FDI 
and asset-augmenting FDI 
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Table 3  Indicators of industrial development, pre and post-liberalsation (1985 and 1997)
Mfg exports primary sector exports mfg imports Mfg, value added primary sector, VA
% of imports (% of GDP)  (% of GDP)  
1985 1998 1985 1998 1985 1998 1985 1998 1985 1998
Asia 
Hong Kong, China 95.1 94.8 4.9 5.3 78.4 88.9 22.1 6.2 8.3 9.1
Indonesia 13.0 45.0 87.0 55.0 72.1 69.1 15.8 24.1 42.4 38.4
Korea, Rep. 91.3 91.3 8.7 8.7 57.2 61.4 29.0 30.9 24.1 17.9
Malaysia 27.2 78.8 72.8 21.2 71.6 84.8 19.3 28.7 39.1 28.1
Singapore 51.2 85.7 48.8 14.3 55.5 84 23.6 23.1 13.8 12.4
Thailand 38.1 74.2 61.9 25.8 60.1 78.1 21.9 30.7 25.8 20.1
Vietnam N/A N/A .. .. N/A N/A
China N/A 87.3 12.7 .. 81.3 35.4 37.5 36.1 30.4
India 58.1 76.0 41.9 24.0 54.4 53.8 16.5 15.6 43.6 39.2
Pakistan 61.9 83.9 38.1 16.1 50.7 55.3 15.9 15.8 35.1 35.3
Sri Lanka 32.6 N/A 67.4 54.6 .. 14.7 16.5 39.2 32.1
Latin American and Carribean 
Argentina 21.4 34.9 78.6 65.1 75 88.8 29.6 19.1 17.3 15.3
Bolivia 0.4 29.7 99.6 70.3 78.3 85.7 N/A 14.8 22.8
Brazil 43.7 54.7 56.3 45.3 37.9 76.3 33.7 22.7 23.2 14.5
Chile 6.9 17.3 93.1 82.7 64.9 80.7 16.2 16.4 29.0 26.2
Costa Rica 22.4 55.7 77.6 44.3 70.7 85.5 25.5 23.5 29.7 19.8
Colombia 16.9 32.3 83.1 67.7 69.5 79.5 22.0 14.9 31.0 26.1
El Salvador 25.7 46.5 74.3 53.5 56.7 68.5 17.8 21.4 32.5 18.1
Guatemala 20.5 32.8 79.5 67.2 52 76.8 15.8 13.6 29.7 29.8
Jamaica 53.3 N/A 46.8 46.2 .. 19.7 13.8 24.2 24.9
Mexico 27.1 85.2 72.9 14.8 74.8 84.6 24.0 21.3 21.3 12.4
Nicaragua 6.3 8.1 93.7 91.9 57.5 68.8 27.6 15.1 31.1 39.5
Paraguay 5.5 13.6 94.5 86.4 60.3 70.2 14.2 15.5 37.3 35.7
Trinidad and Tobago 18.2 43.8 81.8 56.2 68.8 71.1 6.8 8.5 45.6 29.3
Venezuela, RB 10.0 18.5 90.0 81.5 76.2 82.1 21.9 15.4 26.8 25.0
regional total
Latin America 25.2 48.8 74.8 51.2 61.7 80.2 29.5 20.9 22.3 16.1
East Asia 51.7 81 48.3 19.0 61 74.7 28.8 32.2 33.0 27.3
south Asia 57.2 78.7 42.8 21.3 53.7 55.8 16.1 15.6 42.3 38.3
Source: World development Indicators CD-ROM, 2001
(% of merchandise exports)
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Table 4: Inward FDI stock, various years
avg annual
growth rate
1990 2000 1990 2000 1990-2000
Total global 1 888 672 6 314 271 100 100 23.4%
Total LAC  116 678  606 907 6.2 9.6 42.0%
   Argentina  9 085  73 441 0.5 1.2 70.8%
   Bolivia  1 026  5 574 0.1 0.1 44.3%
   Brazil  37 143  197 652 2.0 3.1 43.2%
   Chile  10 067  42 933 0.5 0.7 32.6%
   Colombia  3 500  19 682 0.2 0.3 46.2%
   Ecuador  1 626  6 796 0.1 0.1 31.8%
   Paraguay   396  1 756 0.0 0.0 34.4%
   Peru  1 330  9 900 0.1 0.2 64.4%
   Uruguay  1 007  2 300 0.1 0.0 12.8%
   Venezuela  2 260  25 846 0.1 0.4 104.4%
Total above  67 440  385 879 3.6 6.1 47.2%
Mexico  22 424  91 222 1.2 1.4 30.7%
  South, East and  297 282 1 183 952 15.7 18.8 29.8%
   China  24 762  346 694 1.3 5.5 130.0%
   Hong Kong, Chi  162 665  469 776 8.6 7.4 18.9%
   India  1 667  18 971 0.1 0.3 103.8%
   Indonesia  38 883  60 638 2.1 1.0 5.6%
   Korea, Republic  5 186  42 329 0.3 0.7 71.6%
   Lao People's De   13   659 0.0 0.0 515.1%
   Malaysia  10 318  54 315 0.5 0.9 42.6%
   Pakistan  1 928  10 611 0.1 0.2 45.0%
   Philippines  3 268  12 688 0.2 0.2 28.8%
   Singapore  28 565  89 250 1.5 1.4 21.2%
   Sri Lanka   681  2 465 0.0 0.0 26.2%
   Taiwan Provinc  9 735  27 924 0.5 0.4 18.7%
   Thailand  8 209  24 165 0.4 0.4 19.4%
   Viet Nam   230  17 956 0.0 0.3 771.1%
Total above  296 107 1 178 440 15.7 18.7 29.8%
NICs  206 150  629 279 10.9 10.0 20.5%
NICs+ China  230 912  975 973 12.2 15.5 32.3%
Late NICs  60 677  151 806 3.2 2.4 15.0%
Asia less above  5 692  56 174 0.3 0.9 88.7%
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 Table 5: Motivation of FDI in Latin America  
 
Sector/objective Primary Manufacturing Services 
Natural resource-
seeking 
Petroleum and gas: 
Venezuela, 
Colombia, Argentina 
Minerals: Chile, 
Argentina, Peru 
  
Market-seeking 
(manufactures) 
 Automotive: 
Mercosur 
Chemicals: Brazil 
Agro-industry: 
Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico 
 
Market-seeking 
(services) 
  Financial services: 
Brazil, Mexico, 
Chile, Argentina 
Telecommunications: 
brazil, Argentina, 
Chile, Peru 
Electrical energy: 
Colombia, Brazil, 
Argentina, Central 
America 
Efficiency seeking  Automotive: Mexico, 
Brazil 
Electronics: Mexico, 
carribean basin 
Apparel: caribbean 
basin, Mexico  
 
Strategic asset-
seeking 
   
 
 
Source: Mortimore (2000) 
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Table 6: indicators of absorptive capacity
Telephone lines tertiary enrolment, 
per 1000 residents share of population BERD (as a % of GDP)
1985 1998 1985 1998 1985 1998
Asia
Singapore 324 562 0.71 0.47 0.2 0.69
HK 323 557 0.49 0.49 0.01
Korea 159 432 0.78 1.65 0.48 2.1
Taiwan 228 420 0.59 1.06 0.6 0.99
Malaysia 62 198 0.08 0.13 0.01 0.17
Thailand 12 84 0.16 0.19 0.02 0.01
China 3 96 0.08 0.1 0.16
India 4 22 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.12
Latin America 
Chile 44 205 0.52 0.73 0.13 0.12
argentina 90 203 0.68 0.47 0.11
Colombia 57 174 0.36 0.51
Cost Rica 80 172 0.31 0.34 0 0.2
Brazil 53 120 0.16 0.18 0.07 0.32
venezuela 70 117 0.56 0.45 0 0.07
Peru 21 67 0.47 0.46 0.01
mexico 49.5 103.6 0.48 0.44 0.14 0.05
Source: UNIDO Industrial Development Report 2002/2003 (Table A 2.13. A2.23, A2.19)
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Table 7: US Patent applications, selected developing countries, selected period
1985-89 1995-1999 1985-89 1995-1999
LAC
Argentina 201 435 40.2 87
Bolivia 4 8 0.8 1.6
Brazil 390 745 78 149
Chile 40 83 8 16.6
Colombia 25 67 5 13.4
Costa Rica 10 38 2 7.6
Dominican Republ 10 11 2 2.2
El Salvador 3 4 0.6 0.8
Guatemala 11 12 2.2 2.4
Guyana 0 0 0
Haiti 7 4 1.4 0.8
Jamaica 6 14 1.2 2.8
Mexico 371 594 74.2 118.8
Nicaragua 0 2 0
Paraguay 2 5 0.4 1
Peru 30 23 6 4.6
Trinidad and Toba 14 4 2.8 0.8
Uruguay 12 15 2.4 3
Venezuela, RB 186 187 37.2 37.4
1322 2251 264.4 450.2
South asia
Bangladesh 0 0 0 0
India 178 794 35.6 158.8
Pakistan 8 16 1.6 3.2
Sri Lanka 2 5 0.4 1
188 815 37.6 163
East Asia
Hong Kong, China 398 1269 79.6 253.8
Indonesia 21 39 4.2 7.8
Korea, Rep. 1428 22473 285.6 4494.6
Malaysia 38 238 7.6 47.6
Philippines 63 69 12.6 13.8
Singapore 107 1329 21.4 265.8
Thailand 27 129 5.4 25.8
Taiwan 5654 31135 1130.8 6227
China 453 841 90.6 168.2
Total EA 8189 57522 1637.8 11504.4
Toatl developing 9699 60588 1939.8 12117.6
Global total 659931 1136030 131986.2 227206
DC As % 1.5% 5.3% 1.5% 5.3%
East asia As % 1.2% 5.1% 1.2% 5.1%
LAC as % 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
Source: US patent and Trademark office 2000
average annualsum
0
0.4
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 Figure 1: FDI distribution by sector, 1988 and 1999
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Figure 2: Latin America, share in global sectoral total
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Primary mining Secondary Food textiles chemicals metal Motor
vehicles
machinery electrical precision tertiary
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